




Essay Series

Introduction



The Wealth Concept as an  
Integrative Factor in Tolowa-Tututni  
Culture

Along the Pacific coast from approximately Crescent City in California to Port Orford in Oregon there existed some eighteen Athabascan speaking settlements which are generally grouped into three tribes, the Tolowa, the Chetco and the Tututni. These tribal divisions are arbitrary categories based on slight dialectic differences. In reality there were a series of villages located usually on river mouths and claiming well defined territories along the coast. Inland, the boundaries between village territories were less sharply delimited. No river had inland settlements of importance except the Rogue, up which some five villages of Tututni were located. In aboriginal times there must have been a population of approximately three thousand. Today only a small remnant of Tolowa still remain in situ. Of the Tututni a handful of survivors is located on Siletz reservation to which the tribe was taken in 1856. Culturally the Tolowa-Tututni are closely related to that sub-area of ~~the~~ northwest coast culture whose <sup>focus</sup> ~~greatest elaboration occurred~~ <sup>Kroeber has placed</sup> among the Yurok and ~~Karok~~ of the Klamath river in northwestern California. However the Tolowa-Tututni represent an internally marginal people whose social, ritual and material ~~existence~~ <sup>†</sup> was far less complex than that of either their northern or southern neighbors.

Mr. Philip Drucker of the University of California has studied the ethnography of these Athabascan groups for two years and his detailed report will appear later. Meanwhile Mr. Drucker has kindly placed his notes at my disposal. These, in addition to <sup>my recent</sup> mine own

A few illustrative cases were selected from Tolowa Notes.

observations, form the basis of this sketch. Mr. Drucker has been consulted in drawing up these comments and his suggestions have often been followed; however, I assume full responsibility for any brashness of interpretation on the basis of material which is unavoidably fragmentary. It is not my purpose to present detailed ethnographic data but simply to excerpt such material as is applicable to my interpretations.

Not every culture integrates its social behavior to a few dominating attitudes, nor need every aspect, even of a relatively integrated culture, necessarily be aligned with major social preoccupations. It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that the emphasis on wealth among the Tolowa-Tututni permeates and shapes a large part of social behavior; that traits may be lent intensity and nuances ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ by such integrative emphases which are lacking in other areas and that such emphases combine with, or produce, related attitudes which embrace the bulk of the cultural <sup>behavior</sup> ~~xxxxxxxx~~ recorded for these people. There are other phases of their ~~cultural~~ life, however, which cannot be subsumed under the integrative attitudes of the culture. When one considers that the content of any culture is an accumulation of diverse historical factors, the surprising aspect is that integration has been achieved at all. The amorphous composition of neighboring tribes in north central California indicates that even where the cultural content is not very different, integrative stresses may be absent and the resulting <sup>societies</sup> ~~cultures~~ are worlds apart. The addition or subtraction of traits will not yield the differences which separate the Tolowa-Tututni from, let us say, the Wintu.

Emphasis on wealth has long been recognized as part of

/ Du Bois, Cora. Tolowa Notes. AA 34: 248-262, 1932.

the northwest coast culture to which the Tolowa-Tututni belong. Like other tribes along this coast, they have a rich subsistence provided by a bountiful environment, and a relatively dense population. This point has been stressed sufficiently often to need no elaboration.

Before discussing the specific aspects of wealth emphasis among the Tolowa-Tututni, I should like to make a distinction between subsistence and prestige economy. By subsistence economy is meant the exploitation of the plentiful natural resources available to any industrious individual. Although there were privately owned fishing sites, ordinarily these were used freely by any person within the village group. The only restriction upon the use of such locations was the temporary mourner's rights. A breach of these rights led to fines, but otherwise every individual was free to pursue his subsistence activities. "Individuals who had been lazy or inefficient in gathering food ... were forced to buy it. If they were too poor to pay for it, they were given food by others but they were looked down upon. 'Anybody could do what he liked with them.'" /

By prestige economy on the other hand, is meant a series of social prerogatives and status values. They included a large range of phenomena from wives to formulae for supernatural compulsion. They embraced mourners' privileges and innumerable personal dignities, the disregard of which was cause for compensation regardless of intent.

In addition to these two forms of economic activity, the Tolowa-Tututni <sup>had</sup> ~~possess~~ certain "treasures" which possess<sup>ed</sup> a minimum consumption value, and which function<sup>ed</sup> as ~~XXXXX~~ media of exchange.

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Du Bois, op.cit. 255.

Primary among these ~~are~~<sup>were</sup> dentalia which ~~are~~<sup>were</sup> the most standardized medium and which most nearly approximated the criteria of money established by economists, viz. durability, divisibility, rarity portability and homogeneity. Other shells, woodpecker scalps, rare pelts, obsidian blades and certain regalia also serve to a lesser extent in transacting negotiations. The significant point in the economic life of these tribes is that these monies served as a medium of exchange primarily in the realm of prestige economy rather than subsistence economy. For example, they are not accustomed to translate the value of dried salmon or a basket into dentalia and then make exchanges whose dentalia equivalents are of equal value. In the realm of subsistence economy the Tolowa-Tututni were on a barter basis without translation into another medium - which is the essence of money economy. In their prestige economy, however, they were definitely money minded and wealth values were associated with social status. All individuals were brought up with the social ideal of driving a hard bargain, of pushing every advantage by means of haggling, and thereby of establishing themselves socially. Since one of the ~~devices~~<sup>means</sup> for acquiring money was the dignity-insult device, a "touchiness" developed which has been characterized as paranoid by Benedict for other regions of the northwest coast. /

In attempting generalizations concerning the limited sphere in which money operates, it is important not to overdraw and over simplify the picture. Thus, a statement was made in a preceding paragraph that an improvident person might be forced to buy food if he had any money. Actually, a rich man would probably rarely, if

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
/ Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture, 222; 1934.

ever, find himself without food; while a poor man could usually depend upon the bounty of a rich kinsman for reasons explained subsequently. Also there were certain phases of subsistence economy which overlapped those of prestige. For instance, a stranded whale was carefully divided on a status basis and any trespass upon the section allotted a given person was bitterly resented and even led to bloodshed. Similarly, the first sealing trip of the year was the prerogative of the person most recently bereaved. In essence, however, these overlaps between subsistence activities and prestige values is referable to sensitivity about prestige values rather than to an actual struggle for livelihood in ~~xxxxxx~~ a subsistence sense. On the whole it may be said with complete validity that the Tolowa-Tututni were on a barter basis in the realm of subsistence economy. Further ~~more~~ the favorable environment made even barter a minor activity. ~~xxxxxx~~ In addition, food was shared by the provident with the improvident within the village group. A successful hunter was expected to be liberal with his kinsmen. The individual<sup>id</sup>ism and scheming<sup>ing</sup> parsimony of prestige economy did not extend to subsistence.

Comparisons have been made between wealth preoccupations of the northwest coast and weat<sup>s</sup>ern European society. Although there is much validity in this contention, differences are revealed upon analysis. In our culture, for instance, subsistence economy functions on a money basis whereas among the Tolowa-Tututni the interplay<sup>in</sup> between money and subsistence was shown to be at a minimum. Money was servic<sup>e</sup>able in the purchase of social protection, and prestige, in sex and in maintain<sup>ing</sup> familial status, but it entered hardly at all into the subsistence equation. In Euro-American society money per se has acquired social value secondarily through the operation of that principle which Vaihinger / calls the "law of the preponderance of the means over the end<sup>s</sup>." Today money is the essential medium through

/ Vaihinger, H. The Philosophy of "As if", XLVI and passing, 1925.

which our subsistence economy operates and secondarily it has acquired prestige values. In Tolowa-Tututni society the equation is different. Subsistence economy is divorced from prestige ~~wealth~~ and money operates in the latter realm. We do not know the history of money in relation to subsistence and prestige wealth <sup>among the</sup> ~~in~~ Tolowa-Tututni ~~society~~ as we do in European society, but as it functioned within the period under observation, there is no indication that their money was anything but a device for dealing in a limited set of social recognitions. There is no hint that money was ever very important in determining whether a man were well or poorly fed and housed. In our society housing and food have become symbols of social rank because money has come to function in both subsistence and prestige economy. For Euro-American society the following equation might be suggested: subsistence  $\longleftrightarrow$  money  $\rightarrow$  prestige. In Tolowa-Tututni society the equation would be: subsistence - (money  $\longleftrightarrow$  prestige)



period under observation, there is no indication that their money was anything but a device for securing a limited set of social recognitions. There is no hint that money was ever very important in determining whether a man were well or poorly fed and housed. In our society housing and food have become symbols of social rank because ~~if~~ money has come to function in both subsistence and prestige economy.

This divorce between the two forms of economy not only sets apart the Tolowa-Tututni system from that of western Europe, it also distinguishes it to a lesser extent from the northwest coast culture of British Columbia. In this area the potlatch feasts were a concomitant of every rich man's social obligations. Subsistence wealth became a primary concern of every wealthy man's social activity. Prestige wealth and subsistence economy were not linked directly through the medium of a money system but they were related ~~to~~ through the ~~feast~~ x feast tradition. Among the Tolowa-Tututni, on the other hand, the feast motif was minimal and was not recognized as part of every rich man's social duties in order to maintain his <sup>status.</sup> ~~prestige.~~

In addition another difference in attitude toward wealth sharply marks off the Tolowa-Tututni from the British Columbia tribes. The distribution and destruction of property for prestige purposes in British Columbia were not only unknown to the Tolowa-Tututni, but they seemed utterly preposterous when it was suggested to them. The extent to which the distribution of property was foreign to them is implied in the behavior of the following anecdote. The incident must have occurred in 1854 or 1855 immediately prior to the removal to Siletz reservation.

A Rogue River girl (Tutoten) married a man from Port Orford (Kwatami). That night the Port Orford people held a dance and the

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man's father broke some strings of dentalia and threw them around. Anybody could pick them up. (the informant) was ashamed so I didn't get any. I guess I was pretty stupid."

I should judge from this account that the idea of gift distribution had percolated down from the north in recent historic times and that a Port Orford man had attempted to imitate what he had heard or seen. Obviously, however, he had no ceremonial mechanisms at his command; nor did he have any assistance from his guests in carrying out a procedure which seemed nothing short of insane to them. The informant still laughs at the procedure, considers it a ludicrous performance and is rueful that she did not join in the general scramble which followed the scattering of the shells.

In relation to the absence of the potlatch, we encounter one of the fundamental attitudes of the Tolowa-Tututni toward wealth. They possessed a consistency and realism in this respect which differentiates them from the British Columbia peoples. Wealth is desirable as the source of all social advantages and preeminences. To destroy or distribute it with a gesture of disdain, as do the more northerly people, is to them a preposterous anomaly and quite beyond their comprehension.

~~The Tolowa-Tututni are also differentiated from the British Columbia peoples by the absence of the concept of interest on loans.~~

~~Although the general wealth stress is far more in the direction of acquisition rather than displays a destruction attitudes, they seem to have omitted this device for accumulating wealth. It is a peculiar omission whose history is probably irretrievable. Such gaps are of course part of even the most consistent social structure.~~

The realistic attitude toward the accumulation of wealth as evinced by the absence of the potlatch, the degree to which subsistence and prestige economy are divorced and the absence of interest on loans serve in part to create an economic sub-area

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The Tolowa-Tututni are also differentiated from the British Columbia peoples by the absence of ~~the~~<sup>a</sup> concept of interest on loans. Although the general wealth stress is directed toward acquisition rather than display and destruction, they seem to have lacked this device for accumulating wealth. It is a peculiar omission whose history is probably irrecoverable. To a greater or lesser extent such inconsistencies are present in every social structure.

The degree to which subsistence and prestige economy are divorced, the absence of the potlatch with the attendant realistic attitude toward accumulating wealth and the absence of interest on loans serve in aprt to create an economic sub-area in a predominantly northwest coast culture which is as different, for example, as communis~~t~~ic Russia and capitalistic western Europe.






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
social satisfaction and prestige-ostentation for its wealth pattern. However the Tututni had less satisfactory expressions of this sort than the Yurok. The Tolowa seemed to lie half way between the two. This does not mean that the intensity of the wealth preoccupation was any less, ~~intense~~, but that it was more introverted.

We are now ready to consider specifically how the wealth attitudes functioned in Tolowa-Tututni society and how far their ramifications permeated and shaped social institutions.

The social unit is the exogamous village consisting primarily of paternal kin. Despite this definition of the social unit, no gens existed in Tolowa-Tututni consciousness. The same situation has been commented upon by Kroeber for the Yurok. Comparable to the absence of the gens concept, was the absence of any concept of society as an abstract tertium quid regulating relationships between persons. All relationships were individualized. It is important to realize that this meant there was no political organization. Therefore there were no crimes in the strict sense of the word. All injuries, whether insult, mayhem or murder, were torts for which compensating payments could buy atonement. In theory at least there was no infringement which a money transaction would not settle. In a society of this type, the rapprochement



between law and finance becomes much more intimate than we are accustomed to envisage it. In fact, the two almost reach identity. Where law and finance are so closely allied in theory, wealth and social power become identified to a marked degree in practice. Social equilibrium was the vested interest of the rich man who dominated each village. As a Tolowa informant said, "Poor people cant say anything. They haven't money to talk with..." The richman functioned as a state surrogate. He was by preference the intermediary in the settlements for injuries and it was to his own best interest to be a negotiator in disputes. This was due to the concept of referred responsibility. By referred responsibility is meant that ultimately it might be incumbent upon the rich man of a village to make payments for the torts committed by any of his village kinsmen. This attitude is consistent with Tolowa-Tututni realism concerning wealth which was brought out in relation to the potlatch. Responsibility meant payments, and responsibility therefore rested ultimately on him who could pay. For example, if a poor young man from Tutoten killed a man from Kwatami, it was the duty of the Tutoten richman



to see that the weregeld was paid. Should peaceful negotiations fail and a feud result, the life of the ~~richman~~ <sup>richman</sup>, rather than that of the insignificant murderer, would be considered adequate compensation. The object of most Tolowa-Tututni feuds was not to kill the guilty person in our sense of the word, but the most important <sup>man</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>i. e. the richest</sup> of his ~~group~~ <sup>group</sup>.

This system of referred responsibility functioned precisely and directly to produce social alignment. It was to the interest of every richman to see that the kin under his jurisdiction should not embroil him in difficulties which would either diminish his wealth or threaten his life. It was customary for the richman or some other responsible adult to exhort the youths in the sweat house not to quarrel with neighbors. <sup>These recommendations</sup> ~~This~~ may not represent an

~~ethical~~ system of ethical education comparable to ours, but ~~it~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> probably as efficacious in achieving social good behavior, ~~because~~ <sup>because</sup>

<sup>they</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> based directly on the paramount social <sup>emphasis</sup> ~~good~~ <sup>culture</sup> of the ~~society~~, namely wealth, which ~~was even more stressed in the education of children.~~

We see that the widespread Indian custom in which youth is exhorted "to be good, not to quarrel"; etc. was intensified in Tolowa-Tututni culture by its direct reference to the wealth value deeply embedded in everyone's social consciousness.

The problem of holding the less wealthy in control has been indicated as a function of the wealth concept accepted by all individuals within ~~the~~ Tolowa-Tututni society. However, the question arises in how far the absolutism of the richman can be held in check for the general welfare of the group where political organization does not exist as a tertium quid to preserve a balance of power. The answer lies in ~~the~~ <sup>inter</sup> mutual <sup>between</sup> dependence ~~of~~ both classes of society. If the poor man depended on the rich one for payment of obligations, the rich <sup>man</sup> depended on the brawn and good will

of the poor which was the underlying threat in every negotiation. Haggling over fines was basic to every settlement and the most successful haggler was often the one who could muster the greater show of ~~power~~ force. Everytime a group or <sup>an</sup> individual parted with wealth in payment for a tort it was because the threat of mayhem or death was a very possible alternative. Fundamentally, <sup>potential</sup> then violence lubricated the social machinery. The following anecdote illustrates a number of points in connection with the checks upon the absolutism of the rich.

" A Port Orford ~~man~~ (Kwatami) man had a wife from Coquille whom he killed. About ten months after she was buried, her family asked this richman up there to get another wife. His people were sick of him. He used to bully them into giving him hides and money. He was a mean man. When he went up to Coquille he took four of his relatives along with him. He thought they would help him fight. He went to the Coquille people and just as he stepped in the house they killed him. His relatives were glad to be rid of him and didn't help him. They just carried his body home to be buried. They didn't try to kill anyone in revenge. They felt the score was even."

It is clear from accounts of this nature that a rich man depends upon the goodwill of his kin group if he <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ to hold in check the latent violence of individual competition. He <sup>could</sup> ~~cannot~~ therefore function as an autocrat, but instead as a successful business man and skillful diplomat.

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explicitly referred to the institution as adoption. To apply the term Tolowa informant slaves to such individuals among the Tolowa. Tututini is in reality as misnomer.

The institution of slavery was also tinted with the general wealth emphasis. Slaves were not taken in war but were acquired through unpaid debt. A man ~~became~~ who became indebted to a richman might himself enter into slavery, or, more probably, would transfer a child in lieu of payment. Debts could be incurred only in the realm of prestige economy as it has been stated previously. Therefore slaves became a source of prestige ostentation. They were symbols of money once owned and loaned. The word ostentation is used advisedly in connection with slavery since slaves were ~~never~~ never sold and were therefore of no value in increasing a man's supply of money. A slave did assist in subsistence occupations but these were not a source of income. <sup>His</sup> ~~His~~ status was approximately that of a poor relative. He lived in the richman's household, was well treated as a rule and in return his loyalty and support <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ expected. In reality slavery was almost a form of adoption. From <sup>a Tututini</sup> ~~one~~ informant no hint of the existence of slavery could be secured until the subject of adoption was brought up. It was not unusual <sup>for a richman to marry</sup> ~~to have the~~ <sup>owner his female slave or to purchase a wife for his male servant,</sup> ~~purchase a wife for his male slave, or himself to marry a female slave.~~ Obviously slavery was not hereditary. ~~and~~ Scarcely more onus seemed attached to it than to poverty, of which it was essentially a reflection. Informants when they were questioned directly said there were ~~two~~ social groups, the rich and the poor. Slaves, apparently were lumped with the latter rather than forming a ~~group~~ ~~of~~ ~~its~~ ~~own~~ ~~separate~~ separate category.

Wealth not only pervades the fields of law, ethics, slavery and the maintenance of social order; it is also basic to marriage where one of its greatest elaborations occurs. Bride prices were about equal to blood money, which means that they varied from about \$80. to \$150. As in weregeld settlements, the wealth status of the individual served to determine the price finally agreed upon. The system of haggling held in this field also.

What a man ~~paid~~ was paid for his daughter, an insult or an infringement of his rights directly reflected his social ranking and it was to his interest to drive as sharp a bargain as possible.

Whether bargaining was the direct result of the wealth emphasis is impossible to say, but that it reflected and heightened monetary engrossments is beyond doubt. Marriage settlements were inter-familial affairs. The large carefully decorated dentalia which ~~for~~ most valuable formed the ~~largest~~ part of the bride price were displayed on shallow baskets, ~~and~~ <sup>They were handled slowly and reverently. Dotalia</sup> were known to influential men of the community much as bibliophiles <sup>among us</sup> know the ~~value~~ <sup>t</sup> history, condition and location of rare editions. With the bride went a dowry, the most important ~~part~~ <sup>item</sup> of which was an elaborately decorated buckskin dancing dress

presented to the groom's mother. <sup>In reality,</sup> at marriage there was an exchange between families which was only slightly in favor of <sup>the woman's family</sup> the ~~brides~~ <sup>dowry and the bride price</sup> when the ~~valuable~~ <sup>translated into</sup> are ~~given~~ <sup>values</sup> and equated.

<sup>Nevertheless</sup> ~~But~~ the fiction existed that a man was enriched by ~~the~~ marrying off his daughter. The bearing of this point will appear later. Actually the bride price was in the nature of a deposit ~~with~~ by the groom's family with the bride's. It established a series of mutual obligations and the brother-in-law became one of the groom's most desirable allies in all litigation. Meanwhile the groom's family had various liens on the deposited bride price and for that reason families attempted to keep bride prices intact. For instance, divorce meant the return of all exchanged properties, including the dowry dress. Obviously it was to the interest of the bride's family to see that the marriage was stable. Here again we find a financial motive functioning as a social stabilizer. In how far the bride's family would permit her to be flagrantly abused before permitting her to return would depend upon the rapacity of the parents. Kroeber says that the Yurok did not permit their daughters to be

ill-used. The Tututni custom of torturing a wife suspected of adultery which will be described later, suggests that they were not <sup>always a</sup> so squeamish as their southern neighbors. If the marriage contract between two families is abrogated by death, the bride's family <sup>may and generally does</sup> offer a substitute instead of returning the bride price.

~~We recognize in this procedure the institution of the sororate. But that the sororate has added connotations, lacking in north central California for instance, is patent because the ever present wealth emphasis is involved.~~

We recognize in this procedure the institution of the sororate; but because the ever present wealth emphasis is involved, it has added connotations and intensities which are lacking in areas like north central California for instance.

Another lien which the man's ~~has~~ <sup>his</sup> upon the bride price is concerned with the death of children. If a child dies, the wife's family <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ obligated to pay the husband for the value of that child.

~~However,~~ He in turn <sup>might make</sup> ~~makes~~ a return gift slightly larger in value so that ultimately the husband <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the loser. If a woman <sup>Such procedure was not obligatory for the husband, however,</sup> ~~leaves~~ her husband after bearing a child, the price of the child <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ subtracted from the bride price. After a certain number of children have <sup>d</sup> been born, they <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ considered <sup>the equivalent of</sup> ~~to equal~~ the bride price and the woman <sup>was free to</sup> ~~may~~ return to her family without submitting them to financial obligations.

The <sup>financial</sup> ~~financial~~ aspects of the marriage contract may be summarized in the following manner. The price paid for the bride <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ only fictitiously as large as the sums usually stated by the informants since the bride's family <sup>made</sup> ~~makes~~ a partial return in

gifts. Marriage established a mutual help contract between families. It <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ considered desirable to hold the bride price ~~xxxxxx~~ in deposit against future contingencies. In case of divorce the contract <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ voided by the return of both the bride price and the dowry. In case of death the contract <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~

continued by substituting another spouse from within the families concerned. A sufficient number of children <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the equivalent of fulfilling the marriage contract and only after their birth ~~then is~~ <sup>was</sup> the wife's family free of the liens ~~on~~ on the bride price. ~~In case~~ <sup>if</sup> children died, <sup>woman's family made a payment</sup> ~~the two families exchange payments in~~ which the husband ~~is slightly the loser~~. We see from this situation that the bride price <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ be interpreted as a loan which the woman worked off for the benefit of her family by bearing children. The exchange of payments upon the death of a child <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ be envisaged as a pledge of good faith on the part of both parties to the contract. ~~The slightly larger payment made by the husband seems inconsistent on the surface. It may perhaps be an acknowledgement of the financial benefits of the husband's family accruing from the dowry.~~

might

In the light of this system, the legal obligations, or the principle of reciprocity as Malinowski envisages it, <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ motivated directly by financial interests. Once more it is essentially the wealth motif which makes the social wheels turn and which places the reciprocal social obligations of the institution of marriage in the light of money interests.

The impregnation of the institution of marriage with the dominant wealth preoccupations served to color sex and familial relationships, especially in the realm of post-marital sex transgressions. Adultery was not only an offense against the highly sensitized egos of the Tolowa-Tututni; it was also an offense against vested interests and was treated as such. The following anecdote illustrates the extreme to which such cases might be carried.

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" A Rogue River(Tutoten) man was jealous of his wife. One day he told her to gather a lot of wood. So she brought in a lot that day, good dry wood as he had told her. Late that afternoon he built a fire, a big blaze. She asked why he was doing that. She didn't know what he was going to do. Then another man came in. She didn't know what was the matter. Then her husband and the other man took her by the arms and held her near the fire. Her husband asked if she had stolen a man (committed adultery). She didn't answer, so they shoved her farther in the fire. They asked her again and she said no. She got all burned down her front. If a woman tells who the man is, they let her go and go after the man and kill him.

If the man refused, or was unable, to pay, he might be seized & mutilated until his kinsmen intervened by agreeing to meet his debt.

B.P.T.

Sometimes he says he will pay and they let him go."

This tale is not an isolated instance of a sadistic individual. It was a generally known device, but probably it was resorted to only in rare cases. If the male culprit were caught, he might be the victim of the force principle which underlay all Tolowa-Tututni behavior, or he could find refuge in the wealth pattern by paying the bride price plus an insult fee to the injured husband. From the point of view of a rapacious husband there was a financial premium on discovering his wife in adultery. When a man conformed in entirety to the social stress upon accumulating wealth, this situation was fraught with possibilities of suspicious, antagonistic and even brutal relationships between spouses.

There are <sup>also</sup> instances where <sup>a</sup>certain brutal inflexibility toward marital transgressions seems to function almost of its own momentum without conscious reference to the wealth element involved. However, <sup>since</sup> this attitude is solely in connection with adultery, in other words with an infringement involving financial transactions, it leads one to suspect that unconsciously the wealth situation may have reinforced, at least, the moralistic one. The two following anecdotes indicate that ~~that~~ <sup>was reported,</sup> a strongly moralistic attitude existed which ~~was not a~~ subconscious wealth emphasis, whatever the unconscious motivations may have been.

As a child the informant was playing on the bank of the Rogue river when she saw the corpse of a woman drift down. Her elders said to her that it must be the body of a woman killed for adultery and that no one would bury it; it would just be washed out to sea. Whether or not this was a correct interpretation, it reveals the sternness of the society toward marital transgressions.

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 A man from Tutoten stole a married woman from Mekwanauten. They returned to Tutoten but the people there chased them away. This might seem at first blush to be based on the desire to avoid embroilment between ~~two~~ two villages closely related by marriage. However, the Tutoten man made an adequate payment to the injured husband which consisted of both a bride price and an insult fee. Despite this, the people of Tutoten refused to receive the couple and they went up river to live by themselves. The severity of ostracism in a society organized around the mutual financial and force obligations of the group, is far from slight.

The education of children fostered the potential attitudes toward sex transgressions which have just been described. Educational precepts stressed the suppression of sex on the one hand and on the other maximized the desirability of wealth. When a boy was about six he was admitted to the men's sweat house and his contacts with women were curtailed. In the sweat house the older men "talked to the boys, told them to make money, how to be rich, not to eat too much or they won't get rich." A boy is warned particularly "not to think about women all the time" but to concentrate instead on wealth. Then "people will think something of him, think what a big man he is." If a mother at meal times showed an inclination to pamper her son, the father might cuff the boy and take him from the dwelling. A wealthy man was supposed to eat slowly and avoid evidences of hunger and greediness. One wonders

whether in analytic terms there could have been any linkage between sex and food cravings which the educational system suppressed simultaneously. One means by which boys were kept partially fed

was through the minor vision quest of the area. They were sent to seek wealth blessings or gambling luck, which is its partial equivalent. The degree to which the educational system was directed toward the acquisition of wealth is revealed in the following quotation from Tolowa Notes, "If a poor man wanted to be rich he had to think about a lot of sad things. He would go to a lucky mountain and cry and wish hard to be rich. He would think of his father and mother and how poor they were. He just sat and cried and thought hard about beads and rich things like that... At dawn he would come back to the village crying. It was awfully sad to hear him... Sometimes people go crazy wishing so hard to be rich."

8 pt  
 Place bracketed sentence above in this footnote.  
 DuBois, op. cit. 255.


Since extra-marital relationships were fraught with danger and were infingements of vested interests, this meant that a very poor man might be denied direct sex outlets. Probably, however, such cases were rare. 8 p f

Although boys were urged to think of wealth and not of women, yet sex and familial gratifications were closely associated with wealth. The intensity of that association is brought out by the following statements of a Tututni informant.

"Only rich men had more than one wife. Sometimes a really poor man never gets married at all. He is just an old bachelor who goes on living with his parents. When they die he has to go live with some rich relative who will take care of him." (insert)

In the education of girls the same wealth-sex antithesis was stressed although the specific instructions naturally differed. Girls had inculcated in them chastity, modesty and industry. A Tolowa informant stated, "No girl must ever walk in front of a man or a boy. If you walked in front of them, people would say you weren't brought up right. Parents had to tell girls all these things, especially how you have to act about men." The incentive parents offered to girls for proper behavior was a high bride price. This of course was a social fiction since the bride price paid for a woman was primarily determined by the financial status of her family. If one wished a girl well one said, "I hope someone buys you for a large price." Virginity was desired in marriage. If a girl were raped, her financial value was definitely lowered. A suitor would be entitled under such circumstances to offer less for her. Her family, therefore, was eager to find the guilty man and bully him into paying as large a bride price as possible. The family of a girl who was deliberately unchaste might whip her, but their attitude toward the man remained the same as in rape. The rape of a widow was a less costly matter although her affinal family would demand compensation. One informant stated that married women were even more modest than unmarried girls. "Some married women are so modest that they wont let anyone see them

make string (rolled on bare thigh)." The reasons are to be sought in the preceding comments on adultery, the financial relationships between families established by marriage, and the fact that village exogamy and patrilocal residence placed the



woman in a community of strangers who were not necessarily friendly. The hostility to which a woman may on occasion be exposed in a strange community is revealed in the following anecdote. That she ~~nighthe~~ <sup>was</sup> posthumously avenged ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> probably very little consolation.

8 pt

" A richman from Port Orford (Kwatami) married a Coquille woman. She said she was going to have a child. The husband was glad. The woman was just lying. Her mother-in-law told her son that his wife was still having her monthlies. So he got his wife to gather wood. He made a big fire. He hired another man to help him. They took the woman and shoved her in the fire. Then the man asked if she was going to have a baby. He said she was still having her monthlies. She wouldn't answer so they shoved her still farther in the fire. Still she wouldn't talk. They pushed her so far in that she died of her burns." /

← It is conceivable that this instance would not have occurred had the woman's family been closer and able to protect her. Nevertheless protection was frequently <sup>must have been</sup> remote since wives from distant villages were felt to have more prestige value than those from neighboring communities.

/ Mr. Drucker states that the moral connected with this anecdote in the minds of the Tolowa-Tututni, was the contamination to which a menstruant woman exposed the group.

So far during the discussion of education as a formative force in women's social attitudes, the wealth concept has acted passively and simply as a reward for acceptable behavior. In shamanism, women had a more active outlet for wealth ideals. The degree to which this incentive might motivate a girl in acquiring supernatural power is illustrated by the following excerpts <sup>c</sup> from <sup>A</sup> the statement of a Tolowa informant.

BK

"There was a young woman who must have been poor because she felt sorry for herself. One day she was eating dried fish eggs and a woman took them away from her because they were too good for a poor person. The girl felt sorry for herself and kept thinking all the time ~~of~~ about the fish eggs. 'Some day I hope I get everything I want,' she said. She used to cry all the time. When she went to sleep she dreamed she would be a doctor... and money would come to her."

To summarize: The education of both sexes stressed the desirability of wealth. Boys were taught to suppress sexual preoccupations although their ultimate gratification was a correlate of money. Girls could express their wealth ideals actively by becoming shamans. A high bride price and the concomitant social status was an inducement to passive social conformity. Once a marriage was made, one has the impression that the stress and strain of sex relations was intensified rather than relaxed as they are in our society. The brittle monogamy and casual philanderings of north central California were out of the question in Tolowa-Tututni society. Women responded to this strain by an increasingly modest attitude probably for the reasons given above.

The stress and strain of the marital situation ~~xxx~~  
~~xxx~~ found ~~one means of expression in~~ jealousy between spouses.  
*is evinced further by outbursts of*

A jealous husband, who might not be driven by suspicions of adultery to "torturing" a confession from his wife, might nevertheless slash her with a knife in rage. A jealous wife would maltreat and scratch her husband until he withdrew in ostentatious sulkiness to the men's sweat house. Co-wives were also intractable if the husband showed any preferences. The following anecdote reveals the stress which might develop in ~~xx~~ a polygynous household and the method of dealing with it. One wonders if the purely architectural problem of having co-wives occupy the same dwelling did not intensify the situation?

The heavy plank houses represented much labor and a man possessed only one. The easily built and semi-permanent bark or skin houses of ~~xxxx~~<sup>some</sup> areas would have permitted wives to live separately and would have eased the strain in a society which simultaneously permitted polygyny and fostered jealousy.

8PT  
 "A Tolowa man from Smith River had five wives. Each one cooks for herself (customary procedure perhaps indicative that cooperation was not assumed?). The man slept with each wife in turn during the course of one night. If he didn't stay long enough with one woman, that woman got jealous. In the morning the man goes back to the sweat house and sweats, then he goes back to the house for breakfast. Then the fight starts. The jealous wife throws hot coals at his crotch. He is all naked and jumps around. Then the women fight with each other, scratch, pull each others hair. The man goes out and lets them fight. If he really gets mad he hits them and then goes in the sweat house for a couple of days and doesn't eat."

There is an impression of basic antagonism between the sexes. <sup>It</sup> ~~which~~ is reflected further in the belief that a ~~man~~ would die within the year if a woman guessed against him correctly in a gambling game. As a result women did not participate directly in this favorite pastime although they were allowed to watch games and place bets. ~~THESE TRIBES~~ In other tribes outside of the northwest coast area women were often debarred from gambling directly against men, but ~~THIS EXPLANATION~~ to my knowledge this <sup>particular</sup> explanation has not been reported. <sup>as the rationalization among the Tolowas</sup> Similarly <sup>boys</sup> who had not known women were considered to be especially lucky in <sup>hard games</sup>

Despite certain implications in the foregoing paragraphs upon the inferior status of women, such was actually not the case. That wives could thoroughly discomfit a husband and drive him to ineffectual <sup>or</sup> sulking in the sweat house, does not imply such a situation. It has already been stated that women derived prestige value from a high bride price, <sup>or can seek direct outlet and monetary rewards in shamanism</sup> For infringement of sextabus, there were penalties for both men and women. The women's penalties took the form of brutal treatment <sup>and</sup> loss of status, but the men were subject to onerous fines. In marriages, the

Even the songs which existed at scenes were compensated. The custom of returning shamans fees for unsuccessful cures was in keeping with Tolowa-Tututni realism in money matters.

bride's dowry which consisted primarily of the valuable buskskin dance dress was a gift to the mother-in-law. She became its custodian and in case of divorce was responsible for its return. Also a girl was not entirely the pawn of her family in contracting a marriage. It will be recalled that in cases of pre-nuptial intercourse the woman's family usually tried to legalize the marriage securing a bride price. Girls were therefore in a position to force a marriage in cases of romantic attachments and this was an opportunity of which they seemed to have availed themselves. Furthermore, a source of income which has not yet been mentioned was primarily, although not exclusively, open to women. I refer to shamanism.

~~This brings us to~~ the wealth concomitants of religion which can be briefly reviewed. As in other phases of society the financial emphasis was present. Shamans received payments for cures. <sup>Formulae were also an source of income.</sup> ~~As important was the knowledge of formulae.~~ These were secured either by purchase or revelation. They can be envisaged as commodities which could be rented. If mourners needed purification, if luck was needed in hunting or fishing, etc. the person who possessed the requisite formula was hired to repeat it. It was usually mumbled so that chance listeners would not learn it. However, a man might definitely purchase the knowledge from the owner and thereafter use it legitimately. In death observances very little destruction of property occurred. Dwellings were left intact if relatives could use them. Canoes, regalia and all paraphernalia of the deceased <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ utilized by his heirs. This attitude is quite in harmony ~~like~~ with their inability to understand the distribution or destruction of property at potlatches. However the Tolowa-Tututni did not minimize this crisis. Instead they characteristically translated it into a series of prestige values which were worth

Formalists were paid for removing tabus.  
 money. Thus mourners had to be <sup>compensated</sup> ~~paid~~ before the community could  
 enjoy the single ceremonial festivity of the year, the ten night  
 dance of the winter months. Also ~~the~~ mourners were surrounded  
 with a whole series of insult potentialities whose breach meant  
 substantial fines. The widely distributed name tabu on the dead  
 was one of the strongest. Certain first fishing privileges for  
 mourners were also recognized. Private ownership of fishing  
 sites, ordinarily in abeyance, was stringently resurrected in case  
 of mourner's status. <sup>The bereaved</sup> ~~Mourners~~ were thrown into a frenzy of  
 "touchiness" and other individuals were penalized for their loss.

→ Here we find another widespread cultural trait given added significance and intensity by its integration into a broader network of related attitudes.

War among the Tolowa-Tututni is a final subject to be briefly discussed in the light of financial aspects. It has been pointed out before that all settlements of torts were carried on by haggling and that the agreement reached rested ultimately on a show of force. If bloodshed were precipitated by personal feuds there might follow a series of <sup>3</sup>murders and <sup>2</sup>ambuscades <sup>1</sup>which really constituted Tolowa-Tututni warfare. Meanwhile with each death or injury the debts for compensatory payments accumulated. This in turn eventually involved the richmen of the villages through the principle of referred responsibility previously mentioned. When the final reckoning came the two sides mustered all available men and camped opposite each other. Several go-betweens met in the neutral center ground and tried to reach a satisfactory settlement. Each side offered compensations for damages and in turn demanded compensations for their own injuries. If an agreement were reached, the side which had inflicted the ~~more~~ more severe damages was the one liable for the larger payment. As Kroeber has stated for the Yurok, "In any event the greater financial drain bore on the winner." Kroeber has also pointed out in this connection that this concept of war is signally ill-adapted from our point of view to a social system organized around the acquisition of wealth. War, which has economic motivation in our culture, had no such interpretation in the area under consideration. The Tolowa-Tututni and their neighbors seem to have failed to interpret this institution to their financial advantage even though the wealth concept was inevitably injected into it.

In addition to the non-acquisitive character of Tolowa-Tututni warfare it will be recalled that interest on loans and debt slavery were also singularly unexploited wealth

The girls of the wealthy among the Tolowa had more elaborate ceremonies than the boys of the poor. This explanation was the better the care of the greater the curiosity at puberty, the larger the bride price which might be expected later. /

<sup>t</sup> institutions from the Euro-American point of view. Such exceptions make the picture of wealth as an integrative factor in Tolowa-Tututni society less convincingly simple and sharp, but it is essential to be aware of such discrepancies in order to correctly balance a portrayal of their culture. Probably no culture is completely integrated. It is to be expected that there will always be found certain institutions and fields of behavior untouched by the dominating ~~XXXXXX~~ drives of the social group. The three ~~XXXXXX~~ institutions just mentioned, are phases of Tolowa-Tututni culture in which wealth concepts were deeply rooted but which were not exploited to maximum advantage. Another case in point is the laxness with which the concept of private property in land functioned. Despite the highly personalized relationships of the culture, individual land ownership was submerged in the interest of the kin group. There were in addition certain institutions which were not only unexploited but also largely untouched by the wealth concept. Primary among these was the girls' adolescence observances. The Tolowa had at least a ceremonial dance where a certain degree of wealth display was possible, although that was not its function. The Tututni, <sup>on the other hand</sup> however, <sup>on adolescence dance,</sup> lacked ~~even this~~. Their rites were purely individual and <sup>contained</sup> ~~lacked~~ <sup>no</sup> practically all wealth emphases except that <sup>a purifying formula terminated observances and that</sup> the girl dressed in the best finery she could muster during the final rites. Slight as this display element was, <sup>there is</sup> one case ~~is~~ on record of an adolescent arousing such envy by her fine clothing, that her death a short time after was attributed to poisoning by <sup>a covetous</sup> ~~an envious~~ enemy. Child birth observances were also singularly free from wealth ~~XXXXXX~~ interpretations. Dentalia were tied on the infant's ankles almost immediately after birth. A father usually gave a feast

when the child was about one year old "so no one would wish him bad luck" which might well include lack of ~~wealth~~ success in

wealth pursuits. Formulators who removed birth contaminations, midwives and cradle makers were all paid for their services. Persons who pierced the

So far certain situations and relationships have been suggested ~~whose practical functioning relationships have not been~~ <sup>but the manner in which they function in daily practice has</sup> children's nasal septum and ear lobes were also recompensed.

discussed. For instance, there are two social classes, the rich and the poor distinguished by separate terms. Slaves, as a by-product of poverty, are grouped with the poor for our immediate purposes. The richman is the state surrogate but no autocrat since he depends

~~he depends~~ upon the good will of his village kinsmen to maintain the show of force ~~which is basic to the institution of~~ <sup>haggling</sup> which is basic ~~attendant upon~~ <sup>to</sup> all financial transactions. Boys are drilled in the

desirability of acquiring wealth. Placing all these factors together and juxtaposing them to the essential democracy so generally found among small aggregates of primitive peoples, one might suppose that there was a constant shift of individuals from one social class to the other. Actually however, informants and case material indicate that this was not the ~~case~~ <sup>situation.</sup> Social status was relatively stable.

The reason maybe discovered by balancing the debits and credits of an individual's financial negotiations. Sources of income, or the potential credit side of everyone's book-keeping were: 1) bride-price for daughters minus her dowry, 2) blood money for a relative who had been killed, 3) payments for a large range of insults 4) mourner's compensation before the ten night dance, 5) <sup>shamanism or</sup> knowledge of formulae <sup>which were required to lift contaminations, especially those of the life crises.</sup> On the debit side however must be entered the reverse

of every one of these items. Theoretically every man's budget was balanced. However let us suppose an optimum situation for the accumulation of wealth. <sup>poor</sup> A man had four daughters and only one son. We should expect him to accumulate a surplus from the bride prices of his daughters. It is true, that as a poor man he might receive only

eighty dollars apiece for them and only a portion of that would be in money ~~dentalia~~. He would then be in possession of approximately two hundred and forty dollars minus approximately one hundred dollars for dowry. If all four daughters remained married and liquidated the marriage contract by bearing children who survived, he ~~would~~ <sup>might</sup> then be in ~~a position~~ <sup>able</sup> to buy his son a high priced woman. In addition he might have accumulated wealth by a knowledge of formulae or shamanism. He would then be in a position to raise the status of the second generation in his family. - Actually however, the moment that he accumulated such a surplus the richman of the village was in a position to tax him proportionally for the settlement of blood feuds, of mourner's rights, or the brideprice paid for the richman's son. The richman was in a position to force these contributions since his <sup>good will and assistance</sup> ~~mediations~~ were essential ~~to~~ <sup>in</sup> maintaining a balance in the debit-credit situation outlined above. It is of course conceivable that a poor man who had succeeded in accumulating wealth would thereby secure followers. He might then establish with their assistance a schismatic village. And it is possible that in rare cases ~~such~~ <sup>this</sup> did occur, but not sufficiently often to disturb the stability between the social classes. The point to be made in this connection is that the educational stress placed upon the acquisition of wealth as the road to social approval, was a social fiction which could not be realized by most of the individuals in whom it was instilled. Benedict ~~xxxxxx~~ in Patterns of Culture / has suggested that one category of psychopaths is produced by a competitive society which instils social ideals which the individual is <sup>inadequate to realize</sup> ~~mentally or temperamentally~~ incapable of realizing <sup>however completely</sup> ~~although~~ he may accept them. That the Tolowa-Tututni society produced such individuals whom it considered, in its own terms, psychopathic, is suggested by their attitude

1 Benedict, op. cit. 274.

toward the very poor. Among the Tolowa-Tututni the society creates demands in the individual which it, as a social mechanism, has no devices for satisfying. This is closely connected with the familiar discrepancy between theory and practice which occurs in many cultures. Here the significant point is ~~that~~ the discrepancy between <sup>systematically implanted</sup> social ideals and the structure for their realization. In other words, the society itself, as a superorganic structure, is dislocated. Whether such a dislocated structure is reflected in the psychology of those who participate in it, is a matter for further investigation.

In conclusion, certain speculations of a generalized nature suggest themselves. This paper has been devoted to demonstrating the extent to which wealth integrated <sup>among the Tolowa-Tututni.</sup> social institutions. However, a dominating engrossment may produce the interrelationship of institutions without necessarily producing function smoothly. ~~a society which will~~ Such I feel to be the case among the Tolowa-Tututni. Although wealth permeated and knit together the structural interrelationships of their institutions, the underlying lubrication of the social machinery was a potential use of force, as exemplified in the the pattern of haggling. The wealth emphasis gave Tolowa-Tututni society its appearance of consistency and coherence, but in reality that very coherence between social forms was the root of deep seated conflicts. It seems possible that institutions which <sup>are rephrased in terms extraneous to their immediate function</sup> ~~are alienated from their direct purpose by reinterpretations~~ produce stress and strain in the structure as a whole, as well as in the individual. For instance, marriage is an institution <sup>whose function is to permit men and women</sup> (to produce offspring with social status and to cooperate for mutual economic advantage. When that direct purpose is elaborated by a whole series of concomitant attitudes and is obscured by a variety

of ramified obligations, the possibility<sup>ies for</sup> ~~of~~ that institution to  
function smoothly and directly ~~is~~<sup>became</sup> more remote. If such is the case,  
there are only two solutions, violent and disruptive outbreaks  
or an intensely repressive formalization. Thus, I feel, that  
the Tolowa-Tututni wealth attitude was instrumental in creating  
tensions which easily broke out in acts of violence. That these  
violences could be deflected by money atonements does not lessen  
the underlying conflicts.